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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/05/2006

Accident number: 174

Accident time: 10:55

Accident Date: 23/12/1996

Where it occurred: Ou Andoung,
Battambang Province

Country: Cambodia

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: CMAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area

Date record created: 14/02/2004

Date last modified: 14/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
incomplete detonation (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it
is not known whether the group had changed from three-man to two-man teams at this time].
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No formal accident report was on record at the country MAC in January 1999. A short report
on the accident written in Khmer was among the paperwork and the following summarises its
content.
The victim was told to get a marking stick by his supervisor. While he was doing so, he stood
on the "booster" of a PMN-2 that had been "destroyed" on 20th December 1996. The "booster"
had lain hidden in a clump of grass 2m (or 4m on an attached sketch-map) from where the
mine was "destroyed". The "booster" left a crater of 10cm diameter x 5cm deep.
[The PMN-2 booster is in a plastic well accessible from the underside of the mine. It is
initiated by a detonator which must also have been in place. This implies that most of the
lower half of the mine was in one piece after it had supposedly been destroyed.]
A poor quality photograph of the victim's boot, some photographs of the accident site and a
sketch map of the area were in the file.

Victim Report
Victim number: 221

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 2 hours 5 minutes

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Legs
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 10:55 and the victim arrived at
Battambang Provincial Hospital at 13:00. The victim had a deep cut in the sole of his right foot
measuring 1.5cm x 2cm x 1.7cm, a damaged toe, a superficial injury to his left shin
(measuring 8cm x 6cm) and a deep cut on his right shin (measuring 7cm x 5cm x 1cm). The
prognosis was that he would recover and go back to work.
Failure to award compensation may be inferred from the absence of a record. The Victim’s
return to work is inferred.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
supervisors failed to ensure that the device was properly destroyed or that the parts of a
disrupted device were found and moved to the scrap area.
This accident illustrates the dangers involved in destroying/deflagrating mines. The PMN-2 is
constructed with its main charge in one half of the body of the mine: placing a charge against
the other side is unlikely to cause a sympathetic detonation.
If the mine had been detonated, the "booster" and detonator would have been initiated and no
dangerous parts left. Complete deflagration achieves the same end. A plastic explosive
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charge is much easier than TNT blocks to place in good contact with the side of the mine and
so ensure a shock-wave transfer and a detonation of the mine.

The HE in the PMN-2 is cast into one side of the mine, then it is usually lacquered. It is black
in the picture above.
The failure to ensure that the field supervisors and deminers knew how to destroy a PMN-2
mine is an apparent failure of training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
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